Abstract
Introduction
The most common definition of privacy is the one by Westin: "Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves, when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others" [1] . According to Westin's definition, individuals as well as groups and institutions have a right to privacy. In a fully networked society, privacy is seriously endangered and cannot be sufficiently protected by privacy legislation. Cryptography technologies now are valuable tools for privacy protection in addition to privacy legislation.
We consider the following scenario of secret leakage [2] : If a police wants to arrest a criminal but knows few clues about him, so it promises to give an award to a person in some group who could provide the most important clue after the criminal is arrested. A group member Alice can provide something to a designated policeman Bob, but she is not sure whether her message could be the most important one. How to leak this clue in an elegant way? To protect the authoritative secret from propagating and anonymity of the member Alice and the policeman Bob, we propose controlled secret leakage scheme.
Trust negotiation is now wide used in electronic commerce [3] . In order for strangers to conduct secure transactions, a sufficient level of mutual trust must be established. Trust negotiation is an approach to establishing trust between strangers through the exchange of authoritative secrets. Thus, controlled secret leakage scheme can be used in trust negotiation.
Horster et al. first proposed an authenticated encryption scheme [4] . Authenticated encryption scheme aimed to achieve the purpose that the signature can only be verified by some specified recipients while keeping the message secret from the public.
Rivest et al. introduced the notion of a ring signature in the paper "How to leak a secret" [5] . Ring signature makes it possible to specify a set of possible signers without revealing which member actually produced the signature.
Lv et al. combined the two notations of ring signature and authenticated encryption together and obtained a new type of authenticated encryption, called ring authenticated encryption [2] . Ring authenticated encryption has the following security properties: semantic-security, recipient-designation, verificationdependence, verification-convertibility, recipientambiguity, recipient-verifiability, signer-ambiguity and signer-verifiability. In [2] , Lv et al. also presented a ring authenticated encryption scheme based on discrete logarithm problem. In [6] , Cao et al. found some weaknesses in Lv et al.'s scheme that Lv et al.'s scheme cannot achieve signer-verifiability and recipient-verifiability properties. Cao et al. also proposed an improved ring authenticated encryption scheme to eliminate these weaknesses.
Identity based public key cryptography proposed by Shamir in 1984 [7] can simplify key management and remove the necessity of public key certificates. This is desirable, especially for these applications which involve a large number of public keys in each execution, such as ring signatures. In [8] , based on Boneh and Frankliny's ID-Based encryption scheme [9] [10] and Zhang and Kim's ID-Based ring signature scheme [11] Cao et al. construct an ID-based ring authenticated encryption scheme.
In 1985, Goldwasser et al. introduced the notion of zero-knowledge (ZK) proof [12] . A zero-knowledge proof is an interactive method for one party (the prover) to prove to another (the verifier) that a statement is true, without revealing anything other than the verity of the statement. An interactive proof usually takes the form of a challenge-response protocol, in which the prover and the verifier exchange messages and the verifier outputs either "accept" or "reject' at the end of the protocol. Zero-knowledge proofs have the following properties:
Completeness. The verifier always accepts the proof if the fact is true and both the prover and the verifier follow the protocol.
Soundness. The verifier always rejects the proof if the fact is false, as long as the verifier follows the protocol.
Zero-knowledgeness. The verifier learns nothing beyond the validity of the fact and cannot even later prove the fact to anyone else.
In this paper, our main contribution is to specify security properties of secret leakage, define controlled secret leakage scheme to protect the secret from propagating and anonymity of the participants, design an ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme.
Definitions

Definition of controlled secret leakage scheme Definition 1: (Controlled secret leakage scheme).
The controlled secret leakage scheme is specified by seven algorithms (protocols).
Signature Generation: The algorithm takes as input message M, the recipient Bob's public key, the signer Alice's private key and all the ring members' identity list L which includes the signer Alice, and outputs a ring signature S. The ring signature S will be published in Bulletin Board System (BBS) or send to the recipient Bob. We assume that anyone can intercept the signature S in transit.
Message Recovery and Verification: The algorithm takes as input a signature S and the recipient Bob's secret key, outputs the authenticated message M and returns 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that the signature S is created by a ring member, respectively. We require that the algorithm outputs the authenticated message M and returns 1 if the ring signature S is generated by the signer honestly.
Zero Knowledge Proof of a Ring Signature: Zeroknowledge proof of a ring signature is a method for the recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that the message M is signed by a ring member listed in the ring set L without revealing any other information. Zero-knowledge proof can control the secret leakage and prevent secret propagation. The algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M, the verifier's private key and a parameter ∆ 1 that can only be computed by the recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that the signature S is really created by a ring member, respectively. We require that the algorithm l returns 1 if two parties do the protocol honestly.
Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: Zeroknowledge proof of recipient is an interactive method for the recipient Bob to prove to a verifier Carol that Bob is actually the designated recipient without revealing any other information. The algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M, the verifier's private key and a parameter Λ 1 that can only be computed by the recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that the signature S is really sent to Bob, respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if two parties do the protocol honestly.
Publicly Verifiable Proof of a Ring Signature: The algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M and a parameter ∆ 2 that can only be computed by the recipient Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that the signature S is really created by a ring member, respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if Bob does the protocol honestly.
Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: The algorithm takes as input a signature S, a message M and a parameter Λ 2 released by Bob, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that the signature S is really sent to Bob, respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if Bob is the real recipient.
Signer Verification: The algorithm takes as input the signature S and a parameter Σ produced when Alice creates the signature, and outputs 1 or 0 meaning accept or reject the information that Alice is the actual signer, respectively. We require that the algorithm returns 1 if the signature S is really produced by Alice. The algorithm should satisfy the condition that only the actual signer Alice could provide such a parameter Σ that makes it equal 1 corresponding to the certain signature S and that will not release the signer's private key.
Security properties of controlled secret leakage scheme
Definition 2: (Security properties of controlled secret leakage scheme). A controlled secret leakage scheme has the following security properties.
Semantic-Security: Any adversary cannot determine whether his guessed message is the actual message signed by the original signer, although he gets a valid signature.
Recipient-Designation: Only the designated recipient can recover the message and verify the ring signature.
Verification-Dependence: If the actual signer and the legal recipient do not reveal some parameters, any verifier cannot check the validity of the signature even though he gets the message and the corresponding signature.
Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability: A designated verifier can be convinced that the message M is signed by a ring member listed in the ring set L by the actual signer or the legal recipient, but the designated verifier is unable to convince anyone else of this fact.
Public Signature-Verifiability: Anyone can verify whether a ring signature is actually produced by at least one of the possible signers after the recipient reveals some parameters.
Recipient-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot know to whom a signature is sent while verifying its validity except the actual signer and the legal recipient.
Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability: A designated verifier can be convinced who is actually the designated recipient by the legal recipient, but the designated verifier is unable to convince anyone else of this fact.
Public Recipient-Verifiability: Anyone can be convinced who is actually the designated recipient by the actual signer or the legal recipient.
Signer-Ambiguity: Anyone cannot determine the identity of the actual signer in a ring of size r with probability greater than 1/r if the actual signer is unwilling to expose himself.
Signer-Verifiability: The actual signer can prove to the recipient that it is he who actually signs the signature.
ID-Based Controlled Secret Leakage Scheme
Our scheme can be built from any bilinear map e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 between two groups G 1 , G 2 as long as BDHP in G 1 is hard and the DDHP in G 1 is easy.
Setup: Let (G 1 , +) and (G 2 ,•) denote cyclic groups of prime order q, let P be a generator of G 1 Step 1. To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1} n , the signer, Alice say, who knows the identity ID Bob of the recipient Bob, whose corresponding secret key is where
Step 2. Choose a random r 1 ∈ Z q * , and compute X =
Step 3. To sign Z Alice utilizes Chow-Yiu-Hui's IDbased ring signature scheme [13] . Choose a random seed A ∈ {0, 1}
Choose a random r 2 ∈ Z q * , and compute X 1 = N-1 , X 1 , c 1 ) .
Step 4. Finally, Alice sends S to the recipient Bob and keeps the seed A secret. An adversary can intercept S in this step.
Message Recovery and Verification: After receiving the signature S = (L, U, V, W, X, A 0 , …, A N-1 , X 1 , c 1 ) , the recipient Bob does the following.
Step 1. If U ∉ G 1 * reject the signature.
Step 3 Zero Knowledge Proof of Recipient: If Bob wants to prove to any designated verifier Carol that the signature S is actually sent to Bob without revealing any other information, they can do as follows:
Step 1. Bob chooses a random nonce r 3 ∈ {0, 1} n and computes
Step 2. Bob sends the message M, the nonce r 3 , the parameter Y and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A 0 , …,
Step 3. Otherwise, terminate the protocol.
Step 4. Carol chooses random integers r 4 , r 5 , r 6 ∈ Z q * , and computes
Bob. Here to sign (r 3 , T 1 ) Carol utilizes Cha-Cheon's ID-based signature scheme [14] .
Step 5. Bob checks the freshness of r 3 and the validity of the signature of (r 3 , T 1 ) by checking whether (P, P pub ,
Diffie-Hellman tuple.
Step Step 1. Bob publishes the message M, the parameter Y and the parameters (L, U, V, W, X, A 0 , …, A N-1 , c).
Step 2. The verifier computes Publicly Verifiable Proof of Recipient: If Bob (or the signer Alice) wants to prove to any verifier that the signature S is actually sent to Bob, they can do as follows:
Step Otherwise, terminate the protocol.
Step 3. The verifier does the following. Compute Signer Verification: The actual signer Alice's identity ID Alice is a ring member listed in L. If Alice is willing to prove to the recipient Bob that she actually leaked the message M, then she does the following.
Step 1. Bob verifies that the signature S = (L, U, V, W, X, A 0 , …, A N-1 , X 1 , c 1 ) is sent to him. The method is same as Message Recovery and Verification.
Step 2. Alice sends the seed A and her identity ID Alice to Bob.
Step 3 
Conclusion
In this paper, we defined secret leakage scheme which consist of seven procedures to protect the secret from propagating and anonymity of the participants. We also specified ten security properties of secret leakage scheme. At last, based on Chow-Yiu-Hui's IDbased ring signature scheme and techniques of zeroknowledge proof we construct an ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme. The proposed scheme satisfies all security properties. And can be used to establish trust in electronic commerce applications.
